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The article deals with the analysis of the place and role of the Constitutional Court in the 
system of separation of powers, for the effective implementation of the system of checks and 
balances. The institutional and legal model of interaction of constitutional justice authorities 
with legislative and executive bodies is formulated on the basis of the comparative legal 
analysis of the regulatory legal acts establishing the powers of constitutional jurisdiction 
authorities in the mechanism of implementation of the system of checks and balances on the 
example of different countries with different forms of government, a number of conclusions 
and suggestions are provided. 
On the basis of the conducted sociological survey, the author comes to the conclusion about 
the special level of efficiency of separate powers of constitutional justice authorities. This 
includes the possibility of applying the procedure for resolving conflicts between public 
authorities, which prescribes that in case of doubt about the powers of a state authority 
regarding the rights and obligations granted to it by the Constitution, the latter has the right to 
appeal to a constitutional jurisdiction authority; consideration by the constitutional justice 
authority of cases arising as a result of parliamentary, presidential elections or referendum; 
making a decision by the constitutional jurisdiction authority on bringing the President, 
ministers and other state officials to justice for violating the constitution; a mandatory 
interpretation of the law in order to resolve inconsistencies in the field of political powers. 
Keywords: Constitutional Doctrine, Constitutional Justice, System of Checks and Balances, 
The Principle of Separation of Powers, The Constitutional Court. 
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El artículo trata del análisis del lugar y rol del Tribunal Constitucional en el sistema de 
separación de poderes, para la implementación efectiva del sistema de frenos y 
contrapesos. El modelo institucional y legal de interacción de las autoridades de justicia 
constitucional con los órganos legislativos y ejecutivos se formula a partir del análisis jurídico 
comparado de los actos jurídicos regulatorios que establecen las competencias de las 
autoridades de la jurisdicción constitucional en el mecanismo de implementación del sistema 
de frenos y contrapesos. sobre el ejemplo de diferentes países con diferentes formas de 
gobierno, se proporcionan una serie de conclusiones y sugerencias. 
Sobre la base de la encuesta sociológica realizada, el autor llega a la conclusión sobre el 
nivel especial de eficiencia de los poderes separados de las autoridades de justicia 
constitucional. Esto incluye la posibilidad de aplicar el procedimiento de resolución de 
conflictos entre autoridades públicas, que prescribe que en caso de duda sobre las 
competencias de una autoridad estatal en relación con los derechos y obligaciones que le 
otorga la Constitución, ésta tiene derecho a recurrir ante un autoridad de jurisdicción 
constitucional; consideración por la autoridad de justicia constitucional de casos que surjan 
como resultado de elecciones parlamentarias, presidenciales o referéndum; tomar una 
decisión por parte de la autoridad de jurisdicción constitucional sobre llevar ante la justicia al 
presidente, los ministros y otros funcionarios estatales por violar la constitución; una 
interpretación obligatoria de la ley para resolver inconsistencias en el campo de los poderes 
políticos. 
Palabras clave: Doctrina Constitucional, Justicia Constitucional, Sistema de Frenos y 
















DIANA ASUNCIÓN BRAVO VÉLEZ, LORENA MARIANA COBACANGO VILLAVICENCIO, LEONARDO MANUEL CUÉTARA SÁNCHEZ, MARGARITA 
GARCÍA RABELO: “PERSPECTIVA DEL VALOR COMPARTIDO EN LA CADENA GLOBAL DE VALOR DEL CAFÉ EN MANABÍ.”
 Oleksandr M. Tupytskyi, Maryna S. Horodetska, Ninel I. Karmanova, Vitalii A. Vdovichen, Leonid Hrytsaienko:“ The Role of the 





On March 20, 2020, the 15th Congress of the 
Bureau of the World Conference on Constitutional 
Justice was held in Strasbourg, France. The 
Congress was attended by 73 delegations of the 
Constitutional Courts of the countries, as well as 3 
international tribunals. The Congress addressed the 
issue of Constitutional Justice and Social 
Integration, as well as included discussions on such 
issues as constitutional documents that strengthen 
the level of social integration; the role of 
constitutional justice in the system of ensuring the 
implementation of the principle of checks and 
balances. 
 
The interest of the international community in the 
problems of constitutional justice and determining 
the place of the Constitutional Courts in the 
implementation of the principle of checks and 
balances is due to the fact that the supreme 
principle of existence and functioning of a 
democratic society and the rule of law is the 
supremacy of the Constitution, which is also the 
main point of constitutional control. As Mollers 
(2013) note that the content and forms of 
constitutional control in different legal systems are 
different. At the same time, constitutional control is 
exetrcised in the field of checks and balances, and 
its main objective is to identify, assess and restore 
the disturbed balance. Constitutional control does 
not allow the irrational reproduction of functional 
disorders or the accumulation of negative social 
energy, which, gaining critical mass, can lead to a 
new social explosion. In practice, this is a choice 
between dynamic, evolutionary or revolutionary 
development (Britannica, 2019). 
 
According to Petriv (2020), constitutional control is 
designed to exclude revolutionary nature and social 
cataclysms. In other words, constitutional control is 
a means and an opportunity to ensure the stability 
of society through its consistent and continuous 
functioning. And this is extremely important for a 
transitional society. The activity of constitutional 
courts is also an incentive for constant 
improvement of the system of state power and 
harmonization of dynamic social relations. 
According to Sadurski (2014), the activity of 
constitutional courts forms a taste for public 
opinion and high quality of public consciousness. It 
plays a serious preventive role, when, acting 
clearly, it encourages lawful, constitutional 
behaviour in not only public authorities, but also 
every member of society. 
 
Blagojević (2017) believes that the Constitutional 
Court, as a public authority with all its 
characteristic features, still has a special legal 
nature. 
First, it is a body of justice that specializes in 
resolving constitutional and legal issues. These are 
primarily constitutional and legal disputes: the 
interpretation and application of the Constitution, as 
well as the issues of the powers of public 
authorities and local self-government. On this basis, 
Kosař and Vyhnánek (2020) consider constitutional 
control from the standpoint of limiting power and 
resolving conflicts regarding constitutional powers. 
Second, the Constitutional Court ensures the 
supremacy and direct action of the Constitution 
throughout the state and in relation to all subjects of 
law. This is the main duty of the Constitutional 
Court, while only the observance of and obedience 
to the Constitution is sufficient for most public 
authorities. The uniqueness of the mission of the 
Constitutional Court is that it is the only public 
authority whose direct responsibilities include the 
subordination of politics to law, political actions 
and decisions to constitutional and legal 
requirements and forms (Cloots, 2016). 
 
The role of constitutional justice in the political 
process is enormous. At the same time, judicial 
constitutional control is designed to address issues 
of law only, and under no circumstances should 
give preference to political expediency, try to assess 
the actions of representatives of different political 
systems outside the legal forms (Halmai, 2018). 
The Constitutional Court acts not only as an arbiter 
of political powers and political decisions, but also 
as a guarantor of the observance of existential rights 
of the social order organized in the state. According 
to Halmai (2017), this function of the Constitutional 
Court does not arise at the behest of any 
government institution, but is directly entrusted to 
the Constitutional Court by law, the highest law of 
the state — the Constitution. 
 
The purpose of specialized institutions of judicial 
constitutional control is that the Constitutional 
Court is created and operates to protect the 
foundations of the constitutional order, fundamental 
human and civil rights and freedoms, ensure the 
supremacy and direct action of the Constitution, as 
well as protect political and legal values proclaimed 
and guaranteed by the Constitution. After all, it is in 
a transitional society that the Constitutional Court is 
called upon to prevent the usurpation of state 
power, to constantly maintain a condition in which 
power limited by law only is possible. It can be 
determined that the Constitutional Court is the main 
body of state power, which provides for the 
restriction of state power itself in favour of the 
principles of law. Nothing, no dogmas about the 
separation of powers, people’s sovereignty, no 
classical schemes of the judiciary should press 
down an objective, comprehensive study of the 
essence of constitutional justice. As the 
Constitutional Court performs the function of 
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subordinating political decisions to the law, it 
guards the deep values and interests of society, 
while ensuring the “gradual extinction” of those 
that hinder the dynamic development of this 
society. 
 
The Constitutional Court performs the function of 
social stabilization and guarantees the legitimacy of 
the process of formation and application of political 
power. The Constitutional Court, in this case and 
within certain limits, creates law, determining 
trends in legislation, creating precedents for the 
interpretation of the Constitution and laws, filling 
gaps in the Constitution itself. After all, the only 
legal act that binds the Constitutional Court in 
considering and resolving cases is, in fact, the 
Constitution, which is a set of general principles of 
law and abstract norms — the objects of 
interpretation. The interpretation of principles and 
norms of such a universal nature and such a high 
rank as constitutional ones gives, in a sense, the 
Constitutional Court constitutive power, and gives 
its acts a constitutional-attributive nature (Bricker 
& Wondreys, 2018). 
 
Achieving these goals is the objective of the 
Constitutional Court, i.e. the administration of 
constitutional justice, and thus reveals the legal 
nature, purpose and place of the Constitutional 
Court in the system of state power, and determines 
the nature of measures taken to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of constitutional 
justice. 
 
The goal of this research is to choose the optimal 
functional model of constitutional justice and the 
arsenal of legal means it is provided with in the 
implementation of the principle of checks and 
balances of the state. 
 
To achieve this goal, it is necessary to achieve a 
number of research objectives: 
 
• conduct a comparative analysis of constitutional 
acts that regulate the activities of the Constitutional 
Court (Constitutional Assembly, Supreme Court) of 
countries with different forms of government; 
• conduct a comparative analysis of the scope of 
powers of the Constitutional Courts in the system of 
checks and balances; 
• conduct a social survey of practicing lawyers of 
the surveyed countries aged 25 to 65 in order to 
assess the effectiveness of the Constitutional Court; 
• based on the results of the study, form a model of 
interaction of the Constitutional Court with the 
legislative and executive authorities in order to 




We base our research on the belief that it is 
impossible to build a democratic society based on 
the rule of law. World experience shows that such 
an approach leads to authoritarianism and 
dictatorship in its various manifestations. 
According to Garoupa (2020), constitutional control 
will inevitably come into conflict with social 
practice if it is aimed at ensuring the rule not of 
natural rights and human freedoms, but the rights of 
authorities. Albert (2017) considers it necessary to 
enshrine the provision that the state recognizes and 
respects universally recognized human rights and 
freedoms as the highest human values in the 
Constitutions of the studied states, emphasizing that 
in exercising power the people and the state are 
limited by these rights and freedoms as by 
applicable law directly. 
 
According to a comparative analysis of Bentsen, 
Mark and Skiple (2019), the constitutions of many 
countries have this formulation. The issue of 
separation of powers is also fundamental. Article 5 
of the Constitution of Armenia (Constitution of the 
republic of Armenia (with the Amendments of 27 
November 2005) stipulates that “state power is 
exercised in accordance with the Constitution and 
laws — on the basis of the principle of separation 
of legislative, executive and judicial powers.” Such 
wording is not common in world practice. In most 
countries, the emphasis is not on the principle itself, 
but on its implementation, ensuring the separation 
of powers. For example, the Constitution of Italy 
(Costituzionedella Repubblica Italiana) states that 
“state power is exercised on the basis of its division 
into legislative, executive and judicial. Legislative, 
executive and judicial bodies are independent.” 
Moreover, in the constitutions of many countries 
the emphasis is on interdependence / Portugal, Art. 
114 /, interaction / Moldova, Art. 6 /, coordinated 
functioning and interaction / Poland Art. 10 /, 
balance / Estonia, Art. 4 / of power, etc. This 
approach seems more justified and provides 
consistency in the implementation of the principle 
of separation of powers. According to Vereeck 
(2018), in order to reveal the content of this 
principle from the standpoint of constitutional 
control, it is necessary to answer the question: what 
are the criteria for assessing the level of 
implementation of this principle? 
 
According to Bricker (2017), the control over the 
legislative and executive branches by the judiciary 
follows from the very principle of separation of 
powers as one of the main principles of a 
democratic state. No legal norm and no action of 
any of the other branches of government, if they 
affect the interests of any person, can remain 
outside the control of the judiciary. The judiciary as 
a whole and the Constitutional Court as its integral 
part must ensure the fullest possible control over 
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the other two branches of power. Pellegrina, 
Garoupa and Saldaña (2018) note that the 
Constitutional Court, in assessing the conformity of 
laws with the provisions of the Constitution, 
implements the principle of the supremacy of the 
Constitution, thus ensuring constitutional justice. 
Neither the Constitution, nor the Law on the 
Constitutional Court gives the Constitutional Court 
the right to refuse to assess the conformity of any 
law or other legal norm with the provisions of the 
Constitution, and none has the right to prohibit the 
court from exercising its function or restricting the 
court in exercising it. It is important to ensure that 
the legislator complies with the limits of his 
freedom of action not only for the existence of the 
rule of law, but also for the development of the 
legal system. The Constitutional Court plays an 
indispensable role here, because, as Pellegrina, 
Garoupa and Gómez-Pomar (2017) points out, it is 
endowed with the exclusive competence — to 
control the legislator’s activities. There is an 
opinion that one of the special possibilities of the 
court’s influence is its ability to establish the limits 
of the legislator’s freedom of action. In general, 
they are stipulated by the Constitution, but the 
Constitutional Court, interpreting the Constitution, 
clarifies them in each case. This is one of the 
mechanisms by which the court either directly 
changes the social, economic and political order, or 
forces the legislator to do so (Meyer, 2019; Sweet, 
2020). 
 
Although the Constitutional Courts generally assess 
the legislator’s freedom of action in various areas 
(for example, in the areas of sentencing policy, 
legal regulation of citizenship, regulation of 
litigation, ratification of international treaties, 
education, family life, health and other spheres, in 
connection with the legislative technique), and in 
different conditions (for example, during the 
economic crisis), they develop the doctrine of the 
legislator’s freedom of action in three directions — 
as regards social rights, in the field of taxes, and 
decisions in connection with judicial power. Since 
the responsibilities of the state are different in the 
context of each fundamental right (fundamental 
rights have different meanings), the freedom of 
action granted to the state and, accordingly, the 
scope of rights subject to review by the 
constitutional court also differs. And the less 
freedom the Constitution gives the legislator, the 
stricter the Constitutional Court needs to control the 
use of this freedom. Conversely, the wider the 
legislator’s freedom of action, the less the 
Constitutional Court needs to intervene in its use, as 
Wendel, Reestman and Claes (2020) argue. 
 
Methods and materials 
 
The study was conducted for 36 weeks using the 
methods of conceptual analysis, sociological, 
comparative law and statistical research methods, 
and the analysis of the results was conducted in 
accordance with the objectives of each stage. 
 
The study was carried out in three stages (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Stages of the study 




• The analysis of the basic scientific works which deal with the activity of 
Constitutional courts and the principle of checks and balances is carried out; 
• The goal and main objectives of scientific research are determined, the 
methodological background is formed, the range of the studied countries, as well 
as the sociological sample is determined. 
Stage 2 
12 weeks 
• A comparative analysis of the Constitutions and legislation of the studied states 
was conducted. 




• A social online survey of citizens of the studied countries aged 18 to 65 was 
conducted to assess the effectiveness of the Constitutional Court;  
• Based on the results of the study, a model of interaction of the Constitutional 
Court with the legislative and executive authorities in order to implement the 
principle of checks and balances is proposed. 
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At the first stage of the study, information on the 
role of the Constitutional Court in the 
implementation of the principle of checks and 
balances was collected and processed using specific 
sociological methods (analysis of expert positions, 
online public survey). The comparative legal 
method allowed studying international standards 
and foreign experience in the implementation of the 
principle of checks and balances by means of 
constitutional justice. 
 
The method of conceptual analysis deserves special 
attention in the context of this study, as it is used to 
reveal the existing mechanisms for implementing 
the principle of checks and balances and the 
formation of the concept of effective constitutional 
justice. 
 
Methodological integrity is used to lay the 
groundwork for this study and to assess the 
importance of the effectiveness of constitutional 
justice from the perspective of citizens. After all, 
research is conducted contrary to traditional views 
on the implementation of the principle of checks 
and balances (methodological individualism), 
which are dominant in legal science. Constitutional 
justice is a complex phenomenon that cannot be 
understood only by assessing it at the individual 
level. Methodological holism allows us to assess 
the mechanisms of the general social rather than the 
individual level (Banfield, 1958), which justifies 
the use of methodological holism as an approach 
that considers social phenomena as existing 
independently. Socio-scientific explanations must 
always be confirmed, depending on what is 
happening at the level of individuals. 
 
In the second stage of the study, countries — 
representatives of different forms of government 
were selected, and a comparative analysis of the 
effectiveness of the Constitutional Court’s 
influence on the activities of legislative and 
executive bodies. For a comparative analysis, the 
authors chose: parliamentary monarchies — Great 
Britain, Japan, Canada, presidential republics — 
USA, Turkey, parliamentary republics — Germany, 
Poland, mixed republics — Romania, Ukraine. 
 
Research Design 
The empirical background of scientific research is a 
sociological experiment conducted by the author in 
the third stage of research. The experiment involves 
4 stages: preparatory and organizational; 
realization; analysis of the data obtained; 
registration of research results. Since the United 
Kingdom, Japan, Canada, USA, Turkey, Germany, 
Poland, Romania, Ukraine are among the countries 
implementing the principle of checks and balances 
which are the subject of our research, in the 
preparatory phase of the sociological experiment 
we prepared questionnaires for online survey of 
1,800 practicing lawyers of the surveyed countries 
(200 questionnaires for each country) aged 25 to 65 
to assess the effectiveness of the Constitutional 
Court. Given the number of active practicing 
lawyers in the surveyed countries, the sample size 
is 7% of respondents. 
 
The questionnaire contained three questions: 
 
1. Do you think that the constitutional justice 
authority of your country has a sufficient power to 
influence the activities of the legislative and 
executive branches? 
2. Do you consider the process of forming the 
composition of the Constitutional Court of your 
country to be in line with international principles? 
3. In your opinion, have there been cases of illegal 
influence on the work of the constitutional justice 





Comparative legal analysis of the main models of 
constitutional justice allows us to conclude that 
monitoring the observance of the principle of 
separation of state power, ensuring the effective 
functioning of the mechanism of checks and 
balances and neutralization of possible political 
disputes can be provided by constitutional 
jurisdiction through the following mechanisms: 
1) the procedure for forming a system of 
constitutional jurisdiction bodies largely depends 
on the form of government and the position of the 
agency in the national mechanism of checks and 
balances and can be implemented: by parliament 
(Poland, Great Britain); government (Japan) 
parliament and head of state (France, Germany); the 
head of state and the senate (USA, Romania), the 
head of state, the executive and the judiciary 
(Turkey); Ministry of Justice (Canada); legislative, 
executive and judicial authorities (Latvia); 
parliament, the head of state and the judiciary 
(Ukraine and others), etc. 
2) application of the procedure for resolving 
conflicts arising between public authorities, 
according to which in case of doubt about the 
powers of a public body regarding the rights and 
obligations granted to it by the Constitution of the 
state, the latter has the right to appeal to a 
constitutional jurisdiction. This procedure works 
effectively in France, Poland, Great Britain, Japan, 
Canada, the USA, Turkey, Germany and other 
countries. In total, the relevant procedure is used in 
43 countries, but in Ukraine, Romania, and other 
countries such a procedure is not provided by law; 
3) consideration of cases arising as a result of 
parliamentary, presidential elections or referendums 
by the body of constitutional justice. This practice 
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exists in Germany, France, the United Kingdom, 
Japan, Canada, the United States, Turkey, and other 
countries (a total of 31 countries), but in Ukraine 
and Poland such disputes are considered by the 
Supreme Court and do not fall within the 
jurisdiction of constitutional justice; 
4) decision-making by the constitutional 
jurisdiction bodies to prosecute the President, 
ministers and other public officials for violating the 
constitution (effective in Germany, Japan, Canada, 
USA, Turkey, and other countries). In some 
countries (Poland, France) special courts on 
impeachment have been established, in others 
(Romania, Lithuania, Russia, Ukraine) this issue, 
although falling within the competence of the 
Constitutional Court, the role of constitutional 
justice bodies in these states is less important in this 
process; 
5) mandatory interpretation of the law in order to 
resolve inconsistencies in the field of political 
power. In Ukraine, as in a number of Central and 
Eastern European countries (Poland, Romania, 
Bulgaria, Slovakia), the Constitutional Court has 
such powers, although most Western European 
countries, the United States and Canada do not have 
such a procedure (Table 1). 
 






parliamentary monarchies presidential republics 
parliamentary 
republics mixed republics 
UK Japan Canada USA Turkey Germany Poland Romania Ukraine 
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yes yes yes yes yes yes no yes yes 
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carrying out the 
obligatory 
interpretation of 
norms of the 
legislation for 
the purpose of 
resolving 
discrepancies in 
the field of 
political powers 
no no no no no no yes yes yes 
Source: author research 
 
We used STATA software to analyse the data 
obtained during the sociological experiment and 
take into account the dynamics of the effectiveness 
of the constitutional justice authorities of the 
studied countries (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. The results of sociological survey 










UK Japan Canada USA Turkey Germany Poland Romania Ukraine 
1. Do you think that the 
constitutional justice 
authority of your 
country has a sufficient 
power to influence the 
activities of the 
legislative and executive 
branches? 
         
Yes 62% 75% 78% 65% 57% 87% 42% 34% 31% 
No 38% 25% 22% 35% 43% 13% 58% 66% 69% 
2. Do you consider the 
process of forming the 
composition of the 
Constitutional Court of 
your country to be in 
line with international 
principles? 
         
Yes 34% 48% 38% 35% 57% 63% 48% 78% 76% 
No 66% 52% 62% 65% 43% 37% 52% 22% 34% 
3. In your opinion, have 
there been cases of 
illegal influence on the 
work of the 
constitutional justice 
authority of your 
country by public 
authorities and their 
officials? 
         
Yes 24% 27% 31% 35% 29%   12% 63% 80 % 85% 
No 76% 73% 69% 65% 71% 88% 37% 20 % 15 % 
Source: author research 
 
According to results of sociological survey, experts 
have not recognized the effectiveness of the model 
of constitutional justice in any country. However, 
the support of certain elements of the proposed 
models allowed forming a single effective model of 
the powers of the constitutional justice body, which 
takes an effective part in the implementation of the 
principle of checks and balances (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. Model of the constitutional justicebody 




The discussion on which branch of power the 
specialized body of constitutional control belongs 
to, what should be the procedure for its 
establishment and the scope of powers continues. In 
some countries, according to the Constitution, the 
body of constitutional control is included in the 
judicial system, in others — acts as a separate body 
(Pócza & Dobos, 2019; Bielen et al., 2018). 
 
Sometimes constitutional control is seen as a 
legislative function. The object of constitutional 
control is not the application of the law, but the law 
itself. In this regard, it seems that the functional 
nature of the Constitutional Court is approaching 
that of the Parliament. However, Reutter (2020) 
unreasonably considers in this way. 
 
Some single out constitutional control as a separate 
branch of power — control power, which is 
obviously an extreme. Pildes (2020a) notes that as 
much as constitutional control is at the center of the 
whole system of control over legality, so much 
constitutional justice is at the center of the system 
of constitutional control bodies, notes. The 
introduction of constitutional justice by the state 
indicates that the state prefers to delegate decision-
making powers on constitutional issues to 
specialized institutions above ordinary courts, as 
such issues may not be resolved by ordinary courts. 
 
According to Goldstein (2020), the specifics of the 
judiciary, in comparison with the “political 
power”— legislative and executive, is its relative 
stability and neutrality, so it is the body of 
constitutional justice and is the main body of 
constitutional control. The Constitutional Court as a 
body of state power, with all its features, has a 
special legal nature. 
 
First, it is a body of justice specialized in resolving 
constitutional and legal issues. These are, first of 
all, constitutional and legal disputes: the very 
interpretation and application of the Constitution, as 
well as the issues of powers are the real core of 
these disputes. On this basis, many scholars 
consider constitutional control from the standpoint 
of limiting power and resolving conflicts regarding 
constitutional authority (Pildes, 2020b). 
 
Second, the Constitutional Court ensures the 
supremacy and direct action of the Constitution 
throughout the state and in relation to all subjects of 
law. This is the main duty of the Constitutional 
Court, while for most state bodies the observance of 
and obedience to the Constitution is sufficient only. 
 
Thus, in countries with specialized constitutional 
jurisdiction, the administration of constitutional 
justice follows directly from the principles and 
norms of the Basic Law. 
 
The Constitutional Court is called upon to prevent 
the usurpation of state power, to constantly 
maintain a state in which only limited power is 
possible. 
 
The study of the constitutions of many states also 
shows that in all sections of the Constitution, where 
The possibility of applying the procedure for resolving 
conflicts arising between public authorities, which 
provides that in case of doubt about the powers of a 
public body regarding the rights and obligations granted 
to it by the Constitution, the latter has the right to 
appeal to a constitutional jurisdiction 
Consideration of cases arising as a result of 
parliamentary, presidential elections or 
referendums by the body of constitutional 
justice 
Decision-making by the constitutional 
jurisdiction body on bringing the President, 
ministers and other state officials to justice 
for violating the constitution 
Mandatory interpretation of the law in order 
to resolve inconsistencies in the field of 
political power 
the procedure for the 
system of a constitutional 
jurisdiction body is carried 
out on a collegial basis by 
the President, the 
Parliament, and  judicial 
self-government bodies 
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counterbalances and restraints must be determined, 
the relationship of the body endowed with powers 
in this area with the constitutional court is clearly 
defined. 
 
Almost all holders of state power, to the extent that 
they deal with the Constitution, also deal with the 
Constitutional Court. According to Phelan (2020), 
the relationship between the Constitutional Court 
and the Parliament is particularly multifaceted. This 
is manifested not only in the formation of 
constitutional courts, determining the 
constitutionality of laws and resolutions of 
parliament, but also in considering the separation of 
powers, resolving disputes over competences, 
exercising control over the form of adoption of 
legislative acts. In the latter case, 
misunderstandings often arise between the 
legislature and the Constitutional Court, especially 
in cases where parliamentary rules are not subject 
to mandatory preventive control. In many countries 
around the world, the issue of parliamentary voting 





Thus, an effective model of the powers of the 
constitutional justice body presupposes that the 
decisions of the constitutional control body over the 
assessment of the legislator’s freedom of action 
must be balanced and justified. Not only does the 
court not have the right to interfere excessively in 
the legislator’s activities, but it must also avoid 
actions that may give the impression that such 
interference is taking place. Such an impression can 
negatively affect the reputation of the court. Public 
confidence in the judiciary strengthens the position 
of the courts within the principle of separation of 
powers. It is public trust that prevents the executive 
power and the legislature from ignoring court 
decisions. The Constitutional Court is the main 
body of state power that provides for the limitation 
of state power itself in favour of the principles of 
law. Understanding and reasonable realization of 
this role is one of the main directions of 
development of constitutional justice in the new 
millennium. 
 
In the new millennium, the system of constitutional 
justice can, however, function effectively and fully 
with certain necessary and sufficient prerequisites. 
These include: the possibility of applying the 
procedure for resolving conflicts arising between 
public authorities, which prescribes that in case of 
doubt about the powers of a public authority 
regarding the rights and obligations granted to it by 
the Constitution the latter has the right to appeal to 
a constitutional jurisdiction; consideration by the 
constitutional justice body of cases arising as a 
result of parliamentary, presidential elections or 
referendums; making a decision by the 
constitutional jurisdiction body on bringing the 
President, ministers and other state officials to 
justice for violating the constitution; mandatory 
interpretation of the law in order to resolve 
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